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THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND CLASS-




In Class in American Legal Education, Richard Sander provoca-
tively argues that law schools should replace racial preferences with so-
cioeconomic preferences in their admission decision-making processes.
Some of Professor Sander's claims are compelling, for example, his de-
fense of enhanced classroom diversity as an important and desirable
goal,2 and his assertion that diversity ought to include under-represented
f Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
thank Arthur Best, Alan Chen, Russ Pearce, Joyce Sterling, Leah Wald, and David Wilkins for their
insightful comments. A special thanks to Kelly Cox, and to Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services
Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, for their
research assistance.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 663,
668 (2011) [hereinafter Sander, Class in American Legal Education]. Class-based affirmative action
has attracted growing attention since the mid 1990s, and Professor Sander has been a leading con-
tributor to the discourse. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913 (1996); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Les-
sons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847 (1996); Kenneth Oldfield, Social Class-Based Affirmative
Action in High Places: Democratizing Dean Selection at America's Elite Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL
PROF. 307 (2010); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 370, 478-79 (2004) [hereinafter Sander, Systemic Analysis] (assert-
ing that the costs of affirmative action imposed on minority students-lower grades and less learn-
ing, "higher attrition rates, lower pass rates on the bar, [and subsequently] problems in the job mar-
ket"-may outweigh the benefits); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997) [hereinafter Sander, Experimenting]; Richard H. Sander, The
Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1755, 1755, 1819-20 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Sander, Racial Paradox] (arguing that aggressive affirmative action policies implemented by law
schools and large law firms result in counterproductive outcomes: minority lawyers with relatively
weak academic credentials are being hired but subsequently not promoted); Brent E. Simmons,
Should Class-Based Affirmative Action Be Substituted for Race-Based Affirmative Action?, 56
GUILD PRAC. 95, 96, 102 (1999) (arguing that class-based affirmative action would be a poor substi-
tute for racial-based affirmative action). The discourse has expanded outside of the academic arena
to popular venues. See, e.g., Reactions: Is It Time for Class-Based Affirmative Action?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Reactions-Is-It-Time-for/6
2 6 15/.
2. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631. See generally David L.
Chambers et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 495 (2000) (exploring the beneficial effects of desegregating law
schools and the legal profession); Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender,
Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 541
(1996); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Learning from Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About Race
and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515 (2003); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege and Liberalism in
Legal Education: Teaching and Learning in a Diverse Environment, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 88
(1995).
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constituencies other than racial minorities. Other claims are intuitively
plausible, for example, the contention that historically law schools have
advocated for diversity of all sorts but in practice have focused their pref-
erential admission policies mainly on fostering racial diversity.4 And yet
other claims are questionable. For example, the speculation that so-
cioeconomic preferences would effectively achieve racial diversity, or
the suggestion that socioeconomic and racial preferences are in some
way inherently linked such that pursuing the former must come at the
expense of the latter.6 Such a tradeoff is conceptually dubious as one
could, of course, advocate for both socioeconomic and racial diversity.'
At the end of the day, Sander clearly succeeds in achieving his overall
stated goal: stimulating the diversity discourse and exploring it in new
and exciting directions.8
3. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631, 668-69. While Sander
has been a leader in calling for greater socioeconomic diversity in law schools, others have called for
increased religious, national origin, and students-with-disabilities diversity in legal education. See
Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious Diversity" Got to Do with It?,
78 MARQ. L. REV. 427, 428, 430 (1995) (discussing religious diversity in law school admissions and
accreditation); Meredith George & Wendy Newby, Inclusive Instruction: Blurring Diversity and
Disability in Law School Classrooms Through Universal Design, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 475
(2008) (exploring disability diversity in law school instruction).
4. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631. Law schools have also
successfully addressed gender diversity and some ethnoreligious diversity, but generally speaking,
did so by removing discriminatory admission policies without resorting to preferential treatment of
women, Catholic, and Jewish candidates. On past gender discrimination in law schools' admission
processes, see Eli Wald, Glass-ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2250-51
(2010). Currently, women law students account for approximately fifty percent of the national law
school student body. Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the Legal Profession, 4 ANN. REV.
LAW. & Soc. Sc. 299, 300 (2008). On the use of discriminatory ethnoreligious admission policies,
see Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1837
nn.155-57 (2008). See generally JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON (2005).
5. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 663-64. Sander himself has
admitted elsewhere that "a class-based system is not a fungible substitute for a race-based system,"
at least where racial diversity is the goal. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 1, at 503; see also
Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 504 (1997) [herein-
after Malamud, Response to Professor Sander] (critically analyzing the UCLA experiment with
class-based affirmative action and its negative impact on racial minorities); Deborah C. Malamud,
Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 454, 471 (1997) (arguing that
while class, socioeconomic status, race, gender, and ethnicity are inherently intertwined, class-based
affirmative action would not be an effective substitute for racial-based affirmative action and would
not achieve racial diversity). But see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (asserting that class-based affirmative action should replace race-
based affirmative action even if the former would not achieve the same results as the latter).
6. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 664. But see Deborah C.
Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 729,730
(2011) ("I strongly disagree, however, with Sander's decision to link his class analysis to his critique
ofrace-based affirmative action.").
7. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Race, Class, Diversity, Complexity, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 289,
302 (2004) ("In practice and in principle, affirmative action is not at odds with socioeconomic diver-
sity. When pursued in the interest of important institutional and social purposes, racial justice and
economic justice find common ground, build on common principle, and strengthen a common un-
derstanding of equal opportunity.").
8. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 632-33.
THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
This Response explores only one argument Professor Sander makes
about class diversity: his assertion that socioeconomic status is inherently
invisible. Specifically, Sander argues that, as a matter of fact, socioeco-
nomic preferences are going to be invisible, stating that "once students
have matriculated to a law school, no one can readily tell which of the
others have received a preference;" 9 that the invisibility of socioeco-
nomic preferences makes socioeconomic diversity superior to racial di-
versity and its visible racial preferences; and finally, that such invisibility
is desirable, both because recipients of preferences would likely not
know that they received preference and therefore would not doubt their
own intellectual self-esteem, and because recipients would not be visible
to others and therefore would not suffer stigmatization or become targets
of bias and stereotyping.' 0
Sander is not alone in believing in the invisibility of socioeconomic
status. In a reply to Class in American Legal Education, Richard Lem-
pert similarly argues that "students from lower class backgrounds who
apply to and attend elite law schools may by the time they reach law
school have largely shed their lower class identities,"" adding that
"[f]ower class graduates of elite schools will not stand out in the law
school crowd,"' 2 and concluding that "[lower SES students will, by con-
trast [to racial minority students], blend into the student body, and in
most settings students find themselves in they will be responded to ac-
cording to race, gender, and/or age rather than according to class
status."' 3
To be clear, Sander and Lempert invoke socioeconomic invisibility
for very different, indeed, opposite reasons. Sander sees the invisibility
of socioeconomic status in contrast to the visibility of racial status as a
reason to prefer class-based affirmative action over racial-based affirma-
tive action, 14 whereas Lempert believes that the invisibility of socioeco-
nomic status diminishes the value of socioeconomic diversity and ren-
ders class-based affirmative action undesirable.' 5
Both Sander and Lempert are mistaken about the likely invisibility
of socioeconomic status and preferences. Socioeconomic status and, in
particular, the related concepts of social and cultural capital which in-
form and contribute to it, play a significant role and have a considerable
impact on the experience of law students while at law school and on their
9. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
10. Id. at 665-66.
11. Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L.
REv. 683, 711 (2011).
12. Id. at 712.
13. Id.
14. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
15. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711 ("When it comes to contributing to diversity within law
schools and to social contributions beyond law school, class-based affirmative action may add little
of value.").
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legal careers after graduation.' 6 Importantly, socioeconomic status, the
possession of social and cultural capital and lack thereof are highly visi-
ble, and students of lower socioeconomic status are unlikely to be able to
pass for affluent students or completely cover their status effectively
even if they tried.
The visibility of socioeconomic status means that Sander is also
mistaken about the relative advantage of socioeconomic preferences over
racial preferences. Contrary to Sander's assertion, because socioeco-
nomic status and preferences are going to be visible, to the extent that
visible racial status and racial-based affirmative action result in signifi-
cant costs incurred by its recipients, socioeconomic preferences are likely
to impose similar, if not higher costs. Finally, Sander is wrong about the
desirability of invisibility, that is, even if socioeconomic preferences
were either inherently invisible or coverable, it is not at all clear that re-
cipients should cover their socioeconomic status.
Sander invokes the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences to bol-
ster his argument that class-based affirmative action should replace ra-
cial-based affirmative action." The fact that socioeconomic status and
therefore socioeconomic preferences are visible, however, is not an ar-
gument against class-based affirmative action. Quite the contrary: if so-
cioeconomic status was invisible, Lempert's unpersuasive assertion that
class diversity adds little value to diversity within law schools would be
more compelling.' 8 Instead, while the visibility of socioeconomic status
does weaken Sander's argument regarding the relative advantage of ad-
ministering socioeconomic preferences over racial preferences, it does
support the case for class-based affirmative action. The visibility of so-
cioeconomic status only means that law schools committed to diversity
have to appreciate and anticipate the possible costs socioeconomic pref-
erences might impose on recipients and respond in appropriate fashion
by pursuing measures to enhance the educational experience of recipients
and to mitigate the costs of affirmative action.
I. THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
CULTURAL CAPITAL
A. The Visibility ofSocioeconomic Status
"Once students have matriculated to a law school," writes Professor
Sander, "no one [would be able to] readily tell which of the others have
received a [socioeconomic] preference."' 9 Presumably, one would not be
16. See infra Part I.
17. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666. In Class in American
Legal Education, Sander uses the terms socioeconomic and class interchangeably, see id at 655-66,
and this Response follows his lead.
18. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
19. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
864 [Vol. 88:4
2011] THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STA TUS
able to tell because socioeconomic background, unlike, for example,
gender or racial identity, is invisible.20 Whereas women law students
cannot pass for men law students, and black law students can often not
pass for white law students; students from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds, suggests Sander, can easily pass for more affluent law students
because one's socioeconomic status is supposedly invisible. Professor
Lempert makes the same point more forcefully, arguing that "students
from lower class backgrounds who apply to and attend elite law schools
may by the time they reach law school have largely shed their lower
class identities."2 1 According to Lempert, socioeconomic status is invisi-
ble because all law students, by virtue of attending law school, have ar-
guably attained the same class status such that telling them apart would
be hard, even impossible to do. Furthermore, asserts Lempert, if law stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds have not already "shed" their
class identity, surely they will as lawyers.22
Is socioeconomic status inherently invisible? "Passing," explains
Kenji Yoshino, is the concealment of aspects of one's identity by passive
meansfor example, by remaining silent about certain otherwise salient
characteristics. 23 "Covering" is a more active form of "ton[ing] down a
disfavored identity" by acting pursuant to expectations consistent with
24identity traits one does not possess. Students of lower socioeconomic
status could attempt to pass for hailing from a more affluent status by
remaining silent about their background. For example, they might not
mention in conversations with other law students that they attended pub-
lic schools, public colleges or private colleges on financial aid; they
might refrain from talking about being the first person in their family to
20. Two American Bar Association reports study the experience of perhaps the most visible
minority group within the profession, women of color. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY, WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006); ARIN N. REEVES,
2008 ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FROM VISIBLE INVISIBILITY TO VISIBLY
SUCCESSFUL: SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR LAW FIRMS AND WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2008).
21. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
22. Id. at 714 ("[L]ow SES students who attend elite law schools are seeking and will obtain a
credential that will allow them to transform their class identity from low to high.").
23. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2006).
24. Id. at ix. Yoshino's work on passing and covering is somewhat paralleled by Carbado and
Gulati's study of "identity work." See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260-62 (2000) (exploring a form of covering at the workplace as outsiders
respond to stereotyping by altering their work, and sometimes aspects of their personal identities).
Both works have generated a significant discourse. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering
Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, passim (2007) (discussing both Yoshino's and Carbado &
Gulati's work). Moreover, the works have been built upon by scholars exploring the interplay of
discrimination, stereotyping and professional identity. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl 1.
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1212-13 (2008) (criticizing colorblind-
ness as it relates to admissions); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE
L.J. 728, 812 (2011) (arguing that comparators are no longer useful tools in workplace discrimina-
tion cases); Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance
Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 657, 662-64 (2010) (discussing challenges
faced by plaintiffs in intra-group discrimination suits); Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-
Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 551 (2010) (arguing that courts should recognize
claims of multiracial discrimination).
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attend college or law school; and they might not talk about having to
work part- or full-time while at law school to support themselves.
Yet in the most basic of ways, successful socioeconomic passing is
still doubtful. One might be asked where one attended school, whether
there are any lawyers in one's family, or why one chooses to forgo com-
peting for law review in lieu of working in the library. Or one might be
asked about driving a lemon, having three roommates in an apartment in
a remote part of town, not joining everybody for expensive drinks at the
end of the school day, or about travel plans during spring break. For the
very same reasons, covering one's socioeconomic status, even if one was
willing to try more actively to "fit in," might be quite hard if not impos-
sible to do.
Consider the following examples of passing and covering. Recalling
her experience as a first year law student from a low socioeconomic
background, Lisa Pruitt writes, "I recall needing to keep secret those
familial details," adding "[i]f I was asked about my family of origin, I
probably referred to my father as the owner of a 'small business.' Which
he was, of course; it's just that his office had eighteen wheels and he
spent his days (and very often his nights) traversing the country in it."26
Pruitt concludes, "I now know that my behavior is called 'passing'-
class passing to be precise."27 If passing, for example, by keeping secrets,
was enough, socioeconomic status would be inherently invisible. But
once one has to hide or embellish the truth, one is engaged in the more
proactive act of covering, which suggests that class identity and socio-
economic status are not inherently invisible.
Moreover, covering is sometimes hard to accomplish even if one is
willing to attempt it. Revisiting his law school experience, Ezra Rosser
recalls the following exchange during a job interview: "'You didn't go to
the Corcoran while you lived in D.C.?' I was asked by a member of a
hiring committee incredulously before she reacted by turning away from
me with seeming disinterest in my candidacy,"28 exposing, if you will,
his attempt to cover his class identity. Class privilege, asserts Rosser, "is
infused in every conversation and is an understood shared reference, yet
it is never acknowledged." 29
In particular, the possible need of some students of lower socioeco-
nomic status to work either part-time or full-time while enrolled in law
school deserves special attention because it impacts not only one's visi-
25. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735 ("Unlike Sander, I believe that class is often made visible
through social interaction.").
26. Lisa R. Pruitt, How You Gonna' Keep Her Down on the Farm .. , 78 UMKC L. REV.
1085, 1092 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Ezra Rosser, On Becoming "Professor": A Semi-Serious Look in the Mirror, 36 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 215, 221 (2009).
29. Id. at 222.
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bility, but may also constitute a significant hurdle to one's academic suc-
cess in more direct ways.30 Law school, especially in the first year, is
generally considered an- intense, time-consuming endeavor." Part of
"learning to think like a lawyer" involves reading significant volumes of
case law. Sixty-, seventy-, and even eighty-hour weeks are not unheard
of, and a part-time or full-time job may put one at a significant disadvan-
tage. Considering that performance at the first year of law school is dis-
proportionally important to one's success in law school,32 and that law
school grades are curved such that one is measured and graded explicitly
relative to other law students, a socioeconomic-based time constraint can
turn into a real disadvantage.
Sander proposes that socioeconomic preferences may require a sig-
nificant increase in financial aid to level the playing field.33 Indeed, in
competing for top law students, law schools have recently began to grant
not only tuition waivers but also "cost of living" stipends.3 4 It should be
noted, however, that offering such significant financial support to stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status, even if financially feasible,3 5 would
not necessarily allow for effective passing or complete covering. Finan-
cial aid may address some aspects of disadvantage at law school: it may
alleviate the need of some students to work part- or full-time and allow
them to concentrate on their studies; and it may allow them to pay for
30. See, e.g., JEAN JOHNSON ET AL., PUB. AGENDA, WITH THEIR WHOLE LIVES AHEAD OF
THEM 4 (2009), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/theirwholelivesaheadofthern.pdf
(finding that a primary reason students drop out of college is that they have to work to support them-
selves and their families). Interestingly, while both Sander and Lempert are mindful of the impact of
work commitments on the academic achievements of college students, see Sander, Class in Ameri-
can Legal Education, supra note 1, at 647 ("Much of the reason for underrepresentation of some
groups in law school has to do with low rates of college entrance and completion. This is particularly
true for young Hispanics, who often drop out of high school to help support their families."); Lem-
pert, supra note 11, at 706 ("[A] student who has to work almost a full time job while in school to
pay her college tuition may have grades below those of fellow students whose parents paid their
way."), both appear to overlook the consequences for law students.
31. Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law
School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 77-79 (2002) (summarizing the research showing that the law school
experience is stressful, intensely competitive, time-consuming, and anxiety producing). But see Paul
D. Carrington, The Pedagogy of the Old Case Method: A Tribute to "Bull" Warren, 59 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 457, 460-61 (2010) (documenting educational reforms meant to reduce student stress, if not
time-commitment); Clinton W. Shinn, Lessening Stress of the IL Year: Implementing an Alternative
to Traditional Grading, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 355, 368 (2010) (same).
32. Roger C. Cramaton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321,
329 (1982) ("First-year grades control the distribution of goodies: honors, law review, job place-
ment, and, because of the importance placed on these matters by the law-school culture, even the
student's sense of personal worth."); see Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better IL Assessments, 54
DUKE L.J. 765, 773-75 (2004) (summarizing the literature on the importance of first-year grades).
33. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 660.
34. For examples of such policies, see GA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, BULLETIN 2010-
2011, at 66--68 (2011), available at http://law.gsu.edu/resources/registrar/Collegeof Law
Bulletin _2010-2011 l.pdf; Tuition andFinancialAid, COLUM. L. SCH. (2011), http://www.law.
columbia.edu/jd applicants/admissions/tuition (last visited May 14, 2011).
35. A cost, by the way, that may make socioeconomic preferences quite expensive, perhaps
even more expensive than administering racial preference. This is contrary to Sander's position that
socioeconomic preferences are going to be easier to administer and entail lower costs that racial-
based affirmative action. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 664-68.
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and enroll in bar exam prep courses putting them on equal footing with
their more affluent counterparts.36 But it cannot address some inherent
aspects of socioeconomic status. It will not change where one went to
school, one's family background, what one's parents do for a living, or
where one vacations.37
Three important conceptual clarifications are in order. First, the
visibility of status and identity is not a binary characteristic; rather, it is a
question of degree. Furthermore, some statuses and identities are more
inherently visible than others, for example, racial, ethnic, and gender
identity are more intrinsically visible than class, religious, and national
origin status (assuming one does not have a pronounced accent). Fur-
thermore, some identities and statuses such as race and gender are, if you
will, prima facie visible whereas other, such as socioeconomic status,
may be less obviously so.
To be fair, both Sander and Lempert appear to argue that socioeco-
nomic status is relatively rather than absolutely invisible. Sander points
out correctly that socioeconomic status is not as inherently visible as
racial status." Yet contrary to Sander's position, socioeconomic and ra-
cial identities may nonetheless end up imposing similar costs on recipi-
ents of admission preferences. Socioeconomic status may be less inher-
ently visible than racial and gender identity and more easily coverable,
but still be visible enough to impose costs on and compromise the expe-
rience of law students of lower class standing.
Lempert explicitly acknowledges that visibility is a relative concept,
noting, "I do not mean to suggest that all differences between lower class
and more privileged law students will be wiped out by a shared elite edu-
cation,"39 but believes that class identity can be "shed" and "blended" to
such a degree as to render it invisible. Lower class graduates, maintains
Lempert, "may not only have already have shifted their attitudes to be
more like those of their more privileged peers but will also have shared
with them many of their most important recent life experiences." 4 0 Not
so, argue Pruitt and Rosser. "My failure to learn more about the law
school scene in advance of becoming part of it is not, mind you, because
36. Studying means of legitimizing power and authority, Bourdieu has identified three forms
of symbolic capital: economic capital (money and property), social capital (social networks) and
cultural capital (cultural competence). Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241-58 (John G. Richardson ed.,
1986). Following Bourdieu, significant financial aid would contribute to the economic capital of
students of lower socioeconomic status, but its impact on social and cultural capital would be more
tenuous. See Fiona M. Kay, The Social Significance of The World's First Women Lawyers, 45
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 419-20 (2007), for a discussion of the expanding use of the Bourdieusian
approach in studies of contemporary law practice.
37. In other words, generous financial aid would likely have little direct impact on one's
social and cultural capital.
38. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
39. Lempert, supra note 11, at 712 n.85.
40. Id. at 712.
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I wasn't ambitious," points out Pruitt; rather, "I didn't know enough to
know what I didn't know."4 1 And Rosser, as if directly responding to
Lempert notes "[b]y the time I entered Yale, I had grown more used to
the wealth of my peer group, but had not yet acquired the set of experi-
ences that is the backdrop for conversations among the elite. I needed to
go to Europe, or so everybody said."4 2
Since the visibility of socioeconomic status is a matter of degree
and its impact on law students no doubt varies across students, law
schools, and contexts, one may be tempted to conclude that ultimately
the question of visibility is an empirical one. To an extent, of course, it
is, although it should be noted that while only limited evidence exists, it
tends to support the claim that socioeconomic status is visible and has a
significant impact on law students and lawyers alike.43 Moreover, if
nothing else, one should question Sander's and Lempert's empirically
unsupported sweeping claims regarding the relative invisibility of socio-
economic status. "No heads will turn," argues Lempert, "if an upper class
white student is out with a student from the bottom of the SES pecking
order . . . . If this example seems trivial, consider that no one has ever
posited a crime of 'driving while lower class."' 44 The examples are any-
thing but trivial. The point is not only that some heads may very well
turn in both expensive restaurants and snobbish elite circles if an upper
class student dated a student from a lower class but also that such inter-
class dating may or may not be very common and should not be assumed
to be commonplace. And while no one may have ever been accused of
"driving while lower class," many law students and lawyers have experi-
enced the feeling of "trying to get an elite job while lower class." 4 5
Second, because aspects of one's identity and certain statuses can
change over time, visibility is a dynamic rather than a static characteris-
tic. Lempert, in particular, is of the belief that the class identity of stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds has so changed by the time
they arrive in law school as to render it invisible and meaningless.4
Without a doubt, socioeconomic status can and does change. Rosser, for
example, colorfully explains how he has come to like brie and therefore
has acquired the "the most essential character trait for any aspiring law
41. Pruitt, supra note 26, at 1088.
42. Rosser, supra note 28, at 221.
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. Lempert, supra note 11, at 713.
45. Rosser, supra note 28, at 221. See also Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish
Law Firms, supra note 4, at 1821-25, 1836-42 (discussing the experience of lower socioeconomic
status Jewish lawyers seeking to get hired and promoted by elite Wall Street law firms); THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 144-55 (1991)
(exploring the experience of blue-collar Italian-American lawyers seeking elite positions). See gen-
erally ALFRED LUBRANO, LIMBo-BLUE-COLLAR ROOTS, WHITE-COLLAR DREAMS (2004) (docu-
menting the frustrations of "straddlers," professionals of blue-collar backgrounds who struggle to fit
in the white-collar world).
46. Lempert, supra note I1, at 711-15.
869
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
professor [and lawyer]: I had become comfortable with wealth and privi-
lege." 47 Yet the fact that socioeconomic status is dynamic does not mean
that the hurdles and challenges faced by students (and lawyers) of lower
classes should be overlooked or belittled, and that class passing and cov-
ering should be taken for granted. Moreover, becoming comfortable with
wealth and privilege is very different from attaining, let alone benefiting
from, wealth and privilege.
Finally, Sander points out that the visibility of affirmative action
and admission preferences may be a function not only of the status of
recipients but also of the size of preferences given to them.48 This obser-
vation is related to his controversial "mismatch" hypothesis, pursuant to
which the significant credential gap between recipients and non-
recipients of preferences ends up hurting recipients academically and
subsequently as lawyers. 4 9 Here, Sander merely argues that irrespective
of any possible mismatch effects, the visibility of preferences is likely
going to increase with the size of preferences given. But, of course, the
visibility of preferences is going to increase with their size if and only if
the mismatch hypothesis is correct. Exploring the validity of the mis-
match hypothesis is outside the scope of this Response. Importantly,
however, and regardless of the mismatch hypothesis, socioeconomic
status is not inherently invisible, and therefore, the visibility of socioeco-
nomic status ought to be meaningfully considered in assessing the desir-
ability of class-based affirmative action.
B. The Visibility ofSocial and Cultural Capital
The visibility of socioeconomic status is further evidenced by the
fact that two salient elements of socioeconomic status in play at law
school and upon graduation, "social capital," including the ability to
benefit from existing networks and capacity to effectively build relation-
ships; and "cultural capital," including the possession of confidence and
intellectual self-esteem, are highly visible.so Social capital is a resource
that "exists in the relations among persons."5 It is the sum of the re-
sources that allow a person to accomplish economic and non-economic
47. Rosser, supra note 28, at 220.
48. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
49. Id.; Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1. But see Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon,
Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
649 (2008) (finding only weak empirical support for the mismatch hypothesis).
50. Of course, questions of class, privilege, social capital and cultural capital impact all edu-
cational institutions, not only law schools. See, e.g., Caroline Hodges Persell & Peter W. Cookson,
Jr., Chartering and Bartering: Elite Education and Social Reproduction, 33 Soc. PROBS. 114, 126
(1985); Liz Thomas, Student Retention in Higher Education: The Role ofInstitutional Habitus, 17 J.
EDUC. POL'Y 423, 427 (2002).
51. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. 95,
100-01 (1988) (exploring the use of social capital through demonstrating its effect in the family and
in the community in aiding the formation of human capital).
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goals, achieved through a person's network of relationships. 5 2 This net-
work provides its members with an advantageous credential that arises
from its members' obligations, norms, status, friendships, and esteem
with other members in the network.53 In addition, a person's network,
extended by "friends of friends," connects him with opportunities that
would otherwise not have revealed themselves. 54 This network of rela-
tionships can exist "inter-generationally," within the family, or outside of
it. Outside of the family, social capital "consist[s] of the social relation-
ships that exist among parents, in the closure exhibited by this structure
of relations, and in the parents' relations with the institutions of the
community."5 s
Cultural capital consists of embedded and acquired cultural compe-
tence. It is accumulated through educational accomplishments, travel,
and exposure to a wide of range of experiences, and recognized and re-
flected by one's credentials, personality and conduct. 6 Cultural capital
includes both knowledge, such as mastery of particular subject matters,
language proficiencies, well-roundedness in current affairs, music, the
arts and literature, and the enjoyment of various hobbies; and skills, such
as the development of intellectual self-esteem and confidence, strong
writing capacities, and speaking abilities.57
A significant body of work documents the role of social and cultural
capital in lawyers' careers. Networking social capital, the extent of one's
personal and institutional contacts, is "crucial to advancement within the
52. See Bourdieu, supra note 36, at 249. See generally RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL
HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 8-13 (1992) (discussing how the different types
of capital are invested to create a "profit").
53. See Bourdieu, supra note 36, at 249.
54. See generally JEREMY BOISSEVAIN, FRIENDS OF FRIENDS: NETWORKS, MANIPULATORS
AND COALITIONS 83-96 (1974) (discussing different factors that add to a person's network); Mark S.
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360, 1378 (1973) (demonstrating that weak
connections among groups of people are "indispensable to individuals' opportunities and to their
integration into communities").
55. Coleman, supra note 51, at 113.
56. See Craig Calhoun, Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question ofHistorical Speciicity, in
BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 70 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 1993); see also NAN LIN,
SOCIAL CAPITAL: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ACTION 14-17 (Mark Granovetter ed.,
2001).
57. Some legal scholars have discussed social and cultural capital, as well as other forms of
capital, in terms of "professional capital." See, e.g., Carole Silver, The Variable Value of US. Legal
Education in the Global Legal Services Market, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3-4 (2011); Nancy J.
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Work-
place Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923, 942 n.59 (2002) ("Professional
assets accrue from a combination of human capital, social capital, and cultural capital and are the
'stuff' from which advancement occurs. Human capital is operationalized as the specific lawyering
skills acquired through both legal education and practice experience. Social capital consists of indi-
viduals' ability to draw on relationship networks for establishing support. Although this network may
initially consist of other lawyers in the firm, it may then expand to lawyers in the community and, in
turn, expand to the acquisition of clients. Theorists such as Bourdieu suggest that success in careers
results from the accumulation of these forms of capital.").
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firm,"5 8 increases the likelihood of partnership, 59 and relates to the likeli-
hood of working in more prestigious fields of law, 6 0 leading to higher
earnings.61 On the other hand, limited social capital is identified as a
cause of inequality.62 Similarly, cultural capital has been shown to be an
important and necessary asset for those who seek promotion to partner-
ship, and its concentration in the partnership ranks to produce a structural
transformation and a new stratification of the legal profession, meaning
that those who possess limited cultural capital end up facing an addi-
tional hurdle on their quest for promotion and equality.6 3
Importantly, social and cultural capital also play a significant and
visible role in one's legal education. Lucille Jewel has shown that "stu-
dents who come to legal education with amassed cultural and social capi-
tal are more likely to attend better law schools and achieve higher grades
in law school than students who lack the same amount of cultural and
social capital," concluding that "the level of status and prestige that one
can attain in the practice of law is related to law school status and law
school performance, which are, in turn, related to cultural capital advan-
tages."64 Similarly, Timothy Clydesdale has demonstrated that while
black students have the highest levels of self-confidence upon entering
law school, "they report the lowest level of social capital (i.e., fewest
lawyers in the family) and describe nearly twice as many experiences of
race discrimination during law school as any other minority group."65 In
contrast, "[w]hite American law students have the highest social capi-
tal."66 Clydesdale points out that "[a]ll minority law students . . . have
consistently lower [first-year] GPAs . . . than their white classmates,"6 7
58. Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Cultivating Clients in the Competition for Partnership:
Gender and the Organizational Restructuring of Law Firms in the 1990s, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
517, 542 (1999);
59. See Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Raising the Bar: The Gender Stratification ofLaw-Firm
Capital, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 728, 737 (1998); see also Ronit Dinovitzer, Social Capital and Con-
straints on Legal Careers, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 445, 445-47, 451-52 (2006); Bryant G. Garth &
Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm Apprenticeship: Doing the Time,
Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1361, 1368 (2009).
60. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL. URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
69 (2005).
61. See John Hagan, The Gender Stratification ofIncome Inequality Among Lawyers, 68 Soc.
FORCES 835, 837 (1990); Jo Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex,
Sector and Salary, 29 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 381, 382 (1995).
62. David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The Role ofPublic Service in the Careers
of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1, 27 (2004) (arguing that for black lawyers, a lack
of social capital in the form of elite networks maintains or reinforces their disadvantage in the pro-
fession).
63. See John Hagan et al., Cultural Capital, Gender and the Structural Transformation of
Legal Practice, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239, 239-44 (1991).
64. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2008).
65. Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward Understand-
ing Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 711, 727-32 (2004).
66. Id. at 732.
67. Id. at 736-37.
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speculating that "[slomething intrinsic to the structure or process of legal
education affects the grades of all minorities; [law school first-year] GPA
differences are not explained by differences in academic ability . . . dif-
1168ferences in entrance factors ... or first-year experiences ....
Of course, to an extent, success at law school is a function of merit.
Performance on law school examinations has to do with the ability to
comprehend and analyze a large body of case law, statutes, and secon-
dary materials, and demonstrate critical thinking and effective writing
skills.6 9 It also, however, has a lot to do with possessing social capital
including the ability to network, and cultural capital, including conduct-
ing oneself with confidence and self-esteem. Doing well in law school
requires not only listening to but also understanding professors, their
lingo, and cultural frames of reference. It requires the confidence to
speak up, the ability to take criticisms, even in modified Socratic ways,
constructively, and a thick skin. It requires familiarity and the ability to
deal effectively with a stressful, highly competitive environment, which
puts an emphasis on strong individualism. It requires some sophistica-
tion: in knowing how to interact with law professors to secure mentors,
in knowing to apply for law review, and in seeking and securing extra-
curricular opportunities and activities.70 In short, it requires a healthy
dose of social capital, including proficient networking, and cultural capi-
tal, including self-esteem.n
To be sure, social capital, for example, the ability to network, and
cultural capital, for example, acting confidently showcasing self-esteem,
are not uniquely possessed by the affluent, nor are they binary qualities
one either possesses or not. Rather, social and cultural capital are com-
plex multifaceted phenomena, which some possess more than others. But
it would be imprudent to underestimate the impact of high socioeco-
nomic status on law school performance, and ignore the fact that affluent
students are more likely to possess greater social and cultural capital than
68. Id. at 737; cf Garth & Sterling, supra note 59, at 1365-66, 1393 (suggesting that over
time law school prestige will tend to matter less for large law firm hiring decisions); David Wilkins
et al., Urban Law Schools Graduates in Large Law Firms, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 433, 442 (2007)
(showing that outsider graduates, even of elite law schools, found employment in large law firms
only when they had the appropriate social capital).
69. Critical scholars have compellingly deconstructed the notion of objective merit and ex-
posed its inherent reliance on social and cultural factors. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The
Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-58 (1996).
70. Cf Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education is Failing Women, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 391-92 (2006) (exploring the experience of female law students at Yale Law
School, and specifically investigating why female students, with similar credentials to their male
counterparts, participate less in class discussion and are less likely to form professionally beneficial
relationships with faculty members).
71. Some argue that merit and social capital are so inherently intertwined that it is impossible
to understand one without the other, that is, that defining and assessing "merit" by some set of so-
called objective criteria without exploring it in context is misleading and undesirable. See, e.g.,
Margaret Y. K. Woo, Reaffirming Merit in Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 514, 515 (1997)
(arguing that merit analysis must include considerations such as motivation, maturity and persever-
ance).
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their lower socioeconomic counterparts, and take advantage of their so-
cioeconomic status both while in law school and following graduation.
Those who have been groomed since birth-via prep schools, private
schools, and elite private education-to acquire cultural capital, to be
confident, and to possess social capital, to network effectively, are sim-
ply more likely to do better in law school. Indeed, it is precisely because
social and cultural capital are so visible that students of higher socioeco-
nomic class are well positioned to do better than their less affluent coun-
terparts. Law school and law practice, or at least elite law schools and
elite law practice, implicitly but inherently build on social capital and
networking, as well as on cultural capital and self-esteem, in many fun-
72damental and complex ways.
That is not to say, of course, that law students of lower socioeco-
nomic status who are less likely to be endowed with cultural and social
capital cannot and do not do very well getting into and succeeding in law
school. Deborah Malamud demonstrates the risk of exaggerating the im-
pact of cultural capital on soft entrance variables employed by admission
officers at law schools. On the one hand, the possession of cultural
capital, for example, access to "interesting" life experiences, and of so-
cial capital, such as having family contacts who can provide "interesting"
job leads, is likely to render an affluent candidate more appealing than a
lower class candidate in terms of soft entrance variables.74 On the other
hand, suggests Malamud, admission officers may be impressed by "up
from adversity" stories which candidates of lower socioeconomic status
are more likely to be able to tell.75 Once in law school, students from
lower class backgrounds who do not have as much cultural and social
capital may be at a disadvantage compared to their affluent counterparts,
but may be able to somewhat compensate for that by featuring strong
72. Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of Structuring
Legal Careers, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1, 10 (2007) ("[S]chools are a key site through which students
acquire their professional expectations-schools thereby play a critical role in the reproduction of
social stratification, with students not merely acquiring the skills they require for professional life,
but perhaps more trenchant, adapting to the dispositions necessary for the professional roles they are
destined to take. This can be achieved because schools are themselves embedded in the reproduction
of students' social origins: the prestige of the school that individuals attend is itself a function of their
social class, so that in bestowing degrees and credentials, schools confirm and reaffirm students'
anticipated status within the profession. Research on law schools .. . indeed establishes that these are
key sites in the development of students' expectations and aspirations." (citation omitted)); Rebecca
L. Sandefur, Staying Power: The Persistence of Social Inequality in Shaping Lawyer Stratification
and Lawyers' Persistence in the Profession, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2007) ("Professional
degrees play an important role in social mobility and in the social reproduction of the American
upper-middle class."); see also DEBRA J. SCHLEEF, MANAGING ELITES: PROFESSIONAL
SOCIALIZATION IN LAW AND BUSINESS SCHOOLS 44 (2006). See generally David B. Bills, Creden-
tials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship between Schooling and Job Assignment, 73
REV. OF EDUC. RES. 441 (2003).
73. Malamud, supra note 6, at 742-22.
74. Id. at 743.
75. Id.
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work ethic and personal drive.76 Moreover, while students of lower so-
cioeconomic status may be less likely to have access to interesting jobs
and have limited life experiences of the sort that matter in law school,
they are certainly not clueless.n
The experience of Jewish male law students, the first minority
group to enter the legal profession in relatively large numbers, is reveal-
ing regarding the inherent importance of socioeconomic status on legal
education and law practice. Once discriminatory quotas fell, Jewish male
law students began to attend elite law schools in large numbers. As I
have discussed elsewhere in detail, some Jewish law students, mostly of
German descent, were able to pass or cover as WASPs, demonstrating
the "requisite" cultural capital, and rose to the top of their classes.7 9 As
importantly, what many poor Jewish students of Eastern European de-
scent lacked in visible cultural capital, they made up in personal drive,
self-esteem, and networking. While these students could not pass or
cover for WASP students, they built on a long tradition of learning and
excellence to rise to the top of their classes, and they relied on a signifi-
cant number of Jewish lawyers in the lower spheres of the profession for
necessary networking.80
Still, upon graduation, many Jewish students in the top of their
classes were not hired by elite WASP Wall Street law firms. And while
one might be tempted to think of such discrimination as simply based on
ethnoreligious grounds, the discrimination had significant socioeconomic
and class roots. The elite law firms of the day did not hire Jewish law
students who otherwise met their merit criteria exactly because these
students did not fit their elite socioeconomic and cultural WASP status.8 1
The experience of Jewish male law students thus demonstrates that social
and cultural capital is highly visible both in law school and in law prac-
tice and is hard to cover, and that aspects of socioeconomic status, such
as social capital, including effective networking, and cultural capital,
including the possession of self-esteem, are inherent to one's success as a
law student and as a lawyer.
In sum, if the history of legal education and of the legal profession
teaches us something, it is that socioeconomic status, social capital, and
cultural capital play an inherently integral role in determining one's pro-
fessional fate. In particular, one's socioeconomic status plays an impor-
tant role in determining the quality of one's legal education. And not
76. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 45, at 127-64 (arguing that blue-collar lawyers feature a
particularly strong work ethic).
77. Pruitt, supra note 26, at 1086-88.
78. Wald, The Rise and Fall ofthe WASP and Jewish Law Firms, supra note 4, at 1837.
79. Id. at 1812.
80. Id at 1837-39, 1852; Eli Wald, The Rise ofthe Jewish Law Firm or Is the Jewish Law
Firm Generic?, 76 UMKC L. REv. 885, 928 (2008).
81. Wald, supra note 4, at 1813-25; Wald, supra note 80, at 918-25.
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only are socioeconomic status, social capital, and cultural capital tre-
mendously important to one's legal education and legal career, they are
highly visible and hard to cover.82
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF VISIBILITY: SOCIOECONOMIC AND RACIAL
PREFERENCES REEXAMINED
Sander argues that the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences is
desirable, both because recipients of preferences would likely not know
that they received preference and therefore would not come to doubt
their own intellectual self-esteem, and because recipients would not be
visible to others and therefore would not suffer stigmatization or become
targets of resentment. 83 Because socioeconomic status is visible and be-
cause students of lower socioeconomic status are unlikely to be able to
pass or completely cover it, the purported benefits Sander attributes to
the invisibility of socioeconomic statues are misguided.
The visibility of racial preferences has led to what some have called
the costs of affirmative action. The literature argues that recipients of
racial preferences sometimes experience self-doubt and low self-
esteem.84 In the law school context, knowing that their classmates have
performed better than they have in college and on the LSAT might cause
recipients of preferences feelings of insecurity, and lead to self-
segregation, which in turn impact and compromise the educational expe-
rience at law school.85 Moreover, recipients of racial preferences some-
times experience bias, stereotyping, and resentment as some law profes-
sors and classmates assume that recipients of racial preferences only got
into law school because of their race, and experience similar bias and
stereotyping again when applying for a job.86 The bias further hurts self-
82. Sander and Lempert are not alone in failing to notice and explore the consequences of the
visibility of socioeconomic status. Kenji Yoshino, who popularized the terms passing and covering,
has been criticized for failing to explore class and privilege as aspects of identity that people often
attempt to cover. See Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1294-96 (2007).
83. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
84. JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 229
(2000) (noting that affirmative action "creates private doubt," depriving its recipients of "the unal-
loyed sense of personal, individual responsibility for their accomplishments").
85. See, e.g., John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IowA L. REV. 313, 331 (1994) ("Affirmative action is
wrong because its beneficiaries, by definition, cannot meet the standards and cannot do the work.");
Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 856 (1997) ("Some
critics of affirmative action argue that its pervasiveness has caused successful minorities to suffer a
stigma: the belief that minority achievements are the result of affirmative action, not individual
merit."). Others, however, have discounted the impact of stigma on recipients of affirmative action.
See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1986); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY. JR., NOT ALL BLACK
AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 81 (1996) ("[A]ffirmative action has a
cost ... [and] part of the cost is the risk of stigma ... [however,] the stigma I may suffer is a small
price compared to the price I would pay if I faced closed doors .... ).
86. In his autobiography, Justice Clarence Thomas described the process of his job search
after law school as humiliating, having experienced the stigma and bias of affirmative action first
hand. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 86-87 (2007).
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esteem, an inherent component for success in law school and law prac-
tice, and feeds into the insecurity of racial minority students. This vicious
cycle tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: competent students who
are put down and experience a biased legal education end up not per-
forming as well, supposedly "proving" the biased assumptions of racial
preference.
To the extent that the costs of affirmative action impose harm on its
beneficiaries, the visibility of socioeconomic status and the relative lack
of social and cultural capital, are likely to result in a similar effect on
students of lower socioeconomic status.87 Once it becomes common
knowledge that law schools are granting socioeconomic preferences,88
the visibility of socioeconomic status will likely reveal the identity of
preference recipients, causing them self-doubt and making them likely
targets of bias and stereotyping. Therefore, Sander is mistaken in sug-
gesting that socioeconomic preferences are going to be superior to racial
preferences in the sense of not imposing the costs of affirmative action.
Indeed, in some ways the visibility of socioeconomic preferences
may be harder to overcome than the visibility of racial preferences. If
Sander is right that racial preferences tend to benefit racial minorities of
higher socioeconomic status," then once matriculated, such racial mi-
norities are more likely to possess the self-esteem and networking skills
necessary for success in law school, at least relative to minorities and
other students of lower socioeconomic status. To be clear, all beneficiar-
ies of affirmative action face significant bias and stereotyping challenges,
yet, nonetheless, racial minorities of higher socioeconomic status are
actually likely to possess the social and cultural capital necessary for
attaining success in law school. Students of lower socioeconomic status,
however, will not only face the devastating stigma, bias, and stereotyping
of affirmative action, they are also more likely to actually not possess the
requisite social and cultural capital so essential for professional success.
Moreover, lower socioeconomic status may frustrate class-based af-
firmative action efforts in yet another way less applicable to racial-based
87. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735 ("Sander should acknowledge that very-low-SES students
might well experience some of the down-sides he insists accompany race-based affirmative ac-
tion.").
88. Sander suggests that students benefiting from socioeconomic preference may not be aware
that they received such a preference. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at
666. This suggestion is naive: public universities that would implement class-based affirmative
action in conjunction with their admissions policies would be subject to regulations requiring them
to disclose their admission policies. Moreover, as noted by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Gratz
v. Bollinger, "If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed
College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods,
and disguises." 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 655. But see Deborah C.
Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939,
988-97 (1997) (arguing that alternatives to racial-based affirmative action are unattractive even if
such policies tend to benefit minorities of higher socioeconomic status).
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affirmative action. Two recent trends make students of lower socioeco-
nomic status less likely to apply to law school or enroll even if admitted.
First, law school education, both private and public, has become signifi-
cantly more expensive, in real dollars, over the last fifteen years. 90 This
of course impacts all law students, but constitutes a more significant hur-
dle for students of lower socioeconomic status. Second, the economic
downturn accelerated ongoing trends that make it harder to find a job
after graduating from law school, and even harder to find a well-paying
position that could help address mounting student loans.91 The combined
effect of both trends has been a perceived decline in the value of legal
education, at least in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, with some arguing
that legal education is simply not worth its cost. 9 2
The perceived decline of the value of legal education impacts all
prospective and current law students, as well as practicing attorneys. Yet,
it may have an additional negative impact on prospective students of
lower socioeconomic status. In America, "law is king,"9 3 opined Thomas
Paine, lawyers are the aristocracy, 94 the high priests of a civic religion,95
and members of the ruling class,96 at least in terms of social and cultural
status. This perspective, however, is more likely to be shared by affluent
Americans hailing from higher socioeconomic classes. Therefore, even if
legal education is becoming a less attractive cost-benefit proposition,
such analysis is more likely to deter students of lower socioeconomic
status who cannot afford to pay for it, and less likely to deter students of
affluent backgrounds, who not only can afford to pay the higher costs,
but also apply to law school for reasons other than cost-benefit analy-
sis-the pursuit of an elevated social and cultural status as members. of
90. Denis Binder, The Changing Paradigm in Public Legal Education, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
1, 10-15 (2006) (documenting the law school tuition "explosion"); John A. Sebert, The Cost and
Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516, 516-19 (2002); William K.S. Wang, The
Restructuring of Legal Education Along Functional Lines, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 331, 333
(2008) (summarizing available data on law school tuition increases).
91. Eli Wald, Foreword, The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2051, 2051-52 (2010). William Henderson has documented the distribution of lawyers' start-
ing salaries, concluding, "For many, getting a JD is a very risky financial proposition . . . ." Bill
Henderson, Distribution of 2006 Starting Salaries: Best Graphic Chart of the Year, EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, (Sept. 4, 2007, 3:29 PM), http://www.elsblog.org/the empirical legalstudi/2007/
09/distribution-of.html.
92. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2011, at
BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?src=me&ref-general.
93. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 45, 98 (Isaac Kramnic ed., Penguin Classics 1986)
(1776).
94. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 302-11 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Libr. of Am. 2004) (1835) (analyzing the practice of law in the United States and discussing the
integral role played by the law and lawyers in American society).
95. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of
New York City Lawyers, 1879-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 51, 51-57 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (exploring the elevated role and status of lawyers
in American society).
96. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America 's Governing Class: The Formation and Dis-
solution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381, 383 (2001).
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the legal profession. This, to be sure, is not because students of lower
socioeconomic status have different dreams and aspirations than more
affluent students, but rather because in the real world the former may not
be able to pursue such dreams when their cost-benefit value is declining.
The consequences of the visibility of socioeconomic status cannot
be overstated. If students of lower socioeconomic status are less likely to
apply to law school to begin with, are less likely to enroll even if admit-
ted, are likely to do worse in law school and in law practice relative to
more affluent law students because they do not possess the same social
capital, networking capabilities, cultural capital, and intellectual self-
esteem, then simply administrating socioeconomic affirmative action will
be irresponsible on the part of law schools. This by no means suggests
that law schools should abandon their commitment to diversity and,
when appropriate, to affirmative action. Rather, it suggests that true
commitment to diversity, class diversity included, means that law
schools should do more than simply extend offers of admission to stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status. Social capital skills could be taught
while in law school, and law schools should explicitly and proactively
help students who do not possess these skills to acquire them. Cultural
capital might present more of a challenge, but true commitment to diver-
sity requires law schools to do whatever they can to assist their students
to acquire it.
Interestingly enough, Sander himself has previously made argu-
ments along this very line of reasoning.97 Exploring the costs affirmative
action imposes on black law students, Sander has elsewhere argued that
"[t]he net trade-off of higher prestige but weaker academic performance
substantially harms black performance on bar exams and harms most
new black lawyers on the job market."98 The very same argument would
be applicable to recipients of socioeconomic preferences who would end
up in higher prestige law schools and would likely end up with weaker
academic performance compared with their more affluent counterparts.
Sander might counter that because class-based affirmative action would
require smaller preferences, recipients of lower socioeconomic standing
would not experience a significant a mismatch,99 yet his mismatch hy-
pothesis is controversial and unproven.
Questioning the mismatch hypothesis in the context of the trade-off
between law school prestige and academic performance, David Wilkins
has argued that:
[I]t is precisely because these [affirmative action] policies have been
so successful that for the first time blacks with high grades from
97. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1, at 371-72, 478.
98. Id. at 371-72.
99. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
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lower-status schools have a plausible chance of gaining entry into
high-paying positions in the legal profession. These tentative gains,
however, are unlikely to continue if the number of black graduates
from highly ranked schools were to decline dramatically. 00
This is because the network effects, that is, social capital, of attending
high-status law schools continued to advance the careers of black law-
yers who were "rollin' on the river" of the prestige benefits of those insti-
tutions for many years after graduation. 0'
Regardless of the relative importance of school prestige and aca-
demic performance, Sander's concern with the impact of poor academic
performance on the careers of recipients of affirmative action highlights
the need to pay close attention to the factors that impact academic per-
formance, including social capital, networking, cultural capital, and intel-
lectual self-esteem. Ironically, both academic performance and law
school prestige are not only products of social and cultural capital, but
upon graduation, become elements of one's social and cultural capital.
While Sander and his critics have debated the latter aspects of social
capital, Sander fails to notice the former-that academic performance in
law school is very much a product of the visible aspects of socioeco-
nomic status and social and cultural capital, including networking and
intellectual self-esteem.
Visible affirmative action policies, race-based and class-based alike,
impose costs on recipients of preferences, as well as on non-recipients.
While Sander believes that class-based preferences are likely to be less
costly than race-based preferences, the visibility of socioeconomic status,
the relative lack of social and cultural capital, and the perceived decline
in the value of legal education suggest quite the opposite, that is, that
socioeconomic preferences are likely to be as costly, if not more expen-
sive (once factoring in the cost of increased financial aid), than race-
based preferences. Put differently, Sander is wrong to assert that admin-
istering class-based preferences is going to be cheaper than implement-
ing race-based affirmative action. Yet, as we shall see, the visibility and
cost of class and racial preferences is not a reason to abandon class-based
diversity, or race-based preferences, because the benefits of diversity, for
both recipient and society, may easily outweigh the costs.
100. David B. Wilkins, Response, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Re-
sponse to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2005).
101. See David B. Wilkins, Rollin' on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Para-
dox, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 527, 554 (2000).
880 [Vol. 88:4
2011] THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STA TUS
III. VISIBILITY AND CLASS DIVERSITY
A. The Questionable Desirability ofInvisibility
In touting the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences as an advan-
tage relative to the visibility of racial preferences, Sander makes a ques-
tionable assumption: that invisibility, passing, and covering are inher-
ently desirable. Specifically, Sander believes that because recipients of
socioeconomic preferences would not be visible to others, they would
not suffer stigmatization or become targets of bias and stereotyping.102
Lempert similarly argues that students of lower socioeconomic status
will generally seek to blend into the crowd and shed their class identity,
and that such invisibility would be desirable, signifying progress and
upward mobility.10 3
If racial minorities could pass or cover and avoid some of the costs
of affirmative action, perhaps some would choose to do so. And if socio-
economic status was invisible or completely coverable perhaps some
students of lower socioeconomic status would choose to avoid the
stigma, bias, stereotyping, and self-doubt that comes with preferences
and affirmative action. Yet, it is noteworthy that invisibility, just like
passing and covering, is not inherently either desirable or undesirable.' 0 4
Some people, in some circumstances, may choose to pass, cover, or be
invisible, while others would not. For some, the cost of passing, cover-
ing, or being invisible may be too high a price to pay to avoid the conse-
quences of preferences. One may be proud of her background, of her
parents and of her circumstances and not wish to remain silent about
them. To be clear, passing, that is, remaining invisible, and covering are
legitimate choices. Yet, while remaining invisible has its benefits, suc-
cessful passing and covering entails significant costs that some may find
too high to incur.
Once again, the experience of Jewish male lawyers is instructive in
this regard: Once admitted to elite law schools, some Jewish students
who were able to pass as WASPs or cover their Jewish identity, chose to
do so and accepted positions in elite Wall Street firms.105 To these Jewish
lawyers, the costs of passing and covering were outweighed by the prom-
ise of an otherwise well-deserved career path at the elite firms. Impor-
tantly, however, others chose to embrace their Jewish identity, accepted
the prevailing discriminatory hiring and promotion realities at the WASP
102. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 665-67.
103. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711-15.
104. Interestingly, Yoshino, although popularizing the ideas of "passing" and "covering,"
missed this very point, assuming that passing and covering are always coerced and therefore unde-
sirable. Horwitz, supra note 82, at 1284, 1294; see also Dinovitzer, supra note 59, at 445 (arguing
that social capital is not inherently positive or negative).
105. Wald, supra note 4, at 1836-39.
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firms, and opted to practice with the emerging Jewish law firms.106 For
those who can pass or cover, the choice of whether to remain or become
invisible is far from obvious.
Indeed, the complexity of assessing the desirability of invisibility is
revealed even in instances where the minority group in question does not
have the option of passing and covering, and is forced to visibility. A
rich body of literature examining the experience of women law students
in legal education reveals that some women experience law school as a
male-designed institution, causing them to feel alienated, isolated, and
silenced, and pushing them to become, in meaningful ways, "gentlemen"
as a condition precedent for becoming lawyers. 0 7 Other women, on the
other hand, perceive law school as a meritocratic institution, thrive in it,
and report an enriching and fulfilling educational experience.
Would alienated female law students choose to pass and cover for
men law students if they could? Some would. Indeed, some women law
students report that in order to succeed in law school they attempt to
cover perceived undesirable feminine characteristics. Other women
strongly oppose covering, seeing it as a coercive measure, exactly the
one that causes them to be disillusioned with law school and law prac-
tice. To them, the appropriate response to prevailing male-designed fea-
tures of law school is reform of legal education, not coerced gender cov-
ering.o108
Visibility, as we have seen, is a relative characteristic, with some
identities, for example, gender and racial, being more inherently visible
and harder to cover than others, such as class. From the perspective of
students of all identities and statuses, a decision to remain or seek invisi-
bility is as legitimate as a choice to embrace visibility. Law schools must
embrace both postures-visibility and invisibility-as legitimate, and, in
106. Wald, supra note 80, at 923 (documenting the choice of some Jewish lawyers to opt out of
competing for a position with the elite WASP firms).
107. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 28-29 (1997); Bashi & Iskander, supra note 70, at 391-92, 403, 409 ("De-
spite gender parity in entering J.D. classes, law schools are not adequately preparing female law
students for success .... As individuals, law school professors treat women differently from men,
and as institutions, law schools cultivate and reward pattems of behavior that are more likely to be
found among men than among women . . . ."); Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to Be Human in This
Place": The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 166-70 (1998)
(analyzing the experience women were having in law school and how their conscious career paths
may affect their experiences); Beth Goldstein, Little Brown Spots on the Notebook Paper: Women as
Law School Students, 84 KY. LJ. 983, 1004-07 (1996) (presenting the narrative experiences of
sixteen women involved in law school retention programs); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentle-
men: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994); Cath-
erine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299,
1299-1302 (1998) (discussing the experiences of women law students in the 1980s and examining
the premise that "women experience law school differently" than men).
108. See Eli Wald et al., Looking Beyond Gender: Women's Experience at Law School 41
(Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research Series, Working Paper No. 11-04, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1757882.
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particular, should not assume and encourage passing and covering, and
should not consider invisibility, when possible, desirable. Yet students'
choices regarding visibility have a significant impact on law schools'
institutional perspective and approach to diversity.
B. Visibility, Invisibility, and Class Diversity
While law schools should honor the choices of some students to
pass and cover, they should also be prepared to support the educational
experience of those who cannot avoid visibility and of those who choose
visibility over invisibility. Indeed, true commitment to diversity in legal
education must mean more than simply admitting a diverse class of stu-
dents and relying on the invisibility of the diverse group to lower the
costs of affirmative action and diversity. To be sure, admitting a diverse
class is a very important first step. The past exclusion of ethnoreligious,
gender, and racial minorities and the current exclusion of socioeconomic
minorities reminds us that diversity in admission decisions is not to be
taken for granted. Law schools, however, must remain committed to di-
versity even after they make admission decisions,1 0 9 and, in particular,
assist their students in building and acquiring social and cultural capital.
They must support and enhance the educational experience of all of their
students, those who fully participate in legal education as it stands today,
those who choose to pass for or cover aspects of their identity, and those
who reject passing and covering or cannot pass and cover and are visible
in ways that may hinder the quality of their legal education.
Moreover, even as they respect the choice of some of their students
to pass and cover, law schools (and Professors Sander and Lempert) must
bear in mind that invisibility, passing, and covering contradicts, in mean-
ingful ways, the very essence of diversity and of affirmative action ef-
forts meant to enhance it. If the concept of racial, gender, and socioeco-
nomic preferences in law schools' admissions policies is, at least in part,
to promote the diversity of the viewpoints, backgrounds, and life per-
spectives of the students who compose a class, then invisibility would
work directly to undermine that underlying goal.'lo
Sander's contention that the invisibility of socioeconomic status is
desirable is therefore mistaken for two reasons. First, it trivializes and
usurps an important decision facing minority students. While some mi-
nority students may choose to remain invisible, pass, or cover, others
may wish to bear the costs of visibility so they can celebrate its benefits.
109. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Retaining Diversity in the Classroom: Strategies for
Maximizing the Benefits that Flow from A Diverse Student Body, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 663, 703 (2008)
(exploring strategies for effective incorporation of and retention of diversity in law schools beyond
the admission stage).
110. Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination and Equality in the Legal Profession or
Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2011) (explor-
ing various justifications for diversity applicable to lawyers and the legal profession).
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Assuming or encouraging invisibility is, therefore, both inappropriate
and undesirable. Second, invisibility and successful passing and covering
inherently undermines diversity and affirmative action measures meant
to promote it by silencing the very plurality and richness of perspectives
diversity is supposed to promote. While law schools certainly should not
encourage visibility nor push minority students into playing the "model
minority" role in order to foster to goals of diversity, treating invisibility
as desirable on the ground that it may reduce the costs of affirmative
action might end up sustaining affirmative action while undermining the
very diversity of opinions it is meant to achieve.
If socioeconomic status was invisible or completely coverable, and
if students of lower socioeconomic standing would all choose to cover
their class identity, then Lempert would arguably be more persuasive in
asserting that "[w]hen it comes to contributing to diversity within law
schools . . . class-based affirmative action may add little of value." 11 But
class identity is not completely coverable, and even if it was, some stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status would legitimately choose not to
cover their identity. As a result, class diversity may be of significant
value at law schools.
Consider the following example. A student from a lower socioeco-
nomic class expresses his or her views about the relationship between
corporate bailouts and public welfare. Assuming invisibility or success-
ful passing or covering, no one would necessarily be aware that his or her
perspective is at least partly informed by having been brought up on food
stamps. As a result, the student's views might be dismissed by class-
mates as knee-jerk liberalism, and might hold less weight or credibility
than they would if people knew that the student was poor, and that his or
her views were informed by intimate familiarity with public welfare pro-
grams.l12
111. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
112. I thank my colleague Alan Chen for suggesting this example. See also Angela Onwuachi-
Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What's in a Definition?, 88
DENv. U. L. REV. 807, 825 (2011) (criticizing Sander's characterization of invisibility as desirable
and noting that "[b]ecause [a] low-SES, white student could remain invisible, his classmates never
had the opportunity to learn from him . . ."); Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why
Affirmative Action Needs Race & Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751, 782 n.180 (2011)
("Sander also touts the invisibility of SES preferences. I am not sure if those who lived in the type of
poverty that Sander's SES preferences are designed to help would necessarily agree." (internal
citations omitted)).
Lempert does concede that "some students from lower class backgrounds with elite un-
dergraduate educations make distinct contributions to a law school's education environment which
students from more advantaged backgrounds could not or would not make"; howewer, Lempert "still
maintain[s] that with respect to diversity standpoint an elite law school is likely to get fewer benefits
from admitting more lower SES students than one might expect." Lempert, supra note 11, at 712
n.85. As is likely obvious by now, I believe Lempert underestimates the value of class diversity.
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As Justice O'Connor wrote in describing the University of Michi-
gan Law School's affirmative action plan in Grutter v. Bollinger 13 :
The policy aspires to "achieve that diversity which has the potential
to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class
stronger than the sum of its parts." The policy does not restrict the
types of diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight" in
the admissions process, but instead recognizes "many possible bases
for diversity admissions." The policy does, however, reaffirm the
Law School's longstanding commitment to "one particular type of di-
versity," that is, "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to
the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native
Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented
in our student body in meaningful numbers." By enrolling a "'criti-
cal mass' of [underrepresented] minority students, " the Law School
seeks to "ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the
character of the Law School." "14
The Michigan Law School's program and the Court's decision in
Grutter thoroughly embrace the notion that the goal of diversity is not
simply the demographic composition of the entering class, but the holis-
tic enhancement of all students' education by the introduction of perspec-
tives from across the universe of the human experience. Invisibility,
passing, and covering would not necessarily mask the perspectives (al-
though they might), but they would certainly cover the origins of those
perspectives in ways that would undermine the very goal of socioeco-
nomic affirmative action.
Lempert suggests that a good test for measuring the value of diver-
sity in legal education is to assess the scope and quality of extracurricular
activities that exist in law schools." 5 Reporting that Michigan Law
School "has never started a low SES law journal, nor have there been
groups organized along SES lines to invite speakers to the law school or
to ask for the creation of new courses," 1 6 and that he cannot "recall ever
hearing a non-minority student explicitly reference a personal experience
associated with his family's poverty or low SES,"'1 7 Lempert concludes
that class diversity is likely to add little value to legal education. While
assessing extracurricular activities is a plausible measure of the value of
diversity, Lempert's anecdotal observations are subject to serious ques-
tion. As Deborah Malamud points out, "having been homeless, having
been dependent on welfare, having parents who neither valued education
... nor encouraged it ... differences of these kind . . . can be a source of
113. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
114. Id. at 315-16 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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significant embarrassment for students from lower-SES backgrounds."" 8
Rather than suggesting that class diversity has little value, Lempert's
observations may show instead that students of lower socioeconomic
status were covering their class identities. A plausible approach might be
not to abandon class diversity but rather to make legal education more
supportive and welcoming to students of lower socioeconomic status
such that some may choose visibility over invisibility and enrich the edu-
cational experience of all students.
Lempert further believes that the invisibility of socioeconomic
status and the desirability of such invisibility render class diversity of
little value to social contributions beyond law school. He argues that "[i]t
is doubtful whether elite law school graduates from lower SES back-
grounds would show a .. . disproportionate tendency to serve people like
them.""l9 Lempert offers no support for this speculation and appears to
invoke a narrow construction of "giving back."1 2 0 Diversity, especially
within the legal profession, is justified on the ground that it is closely
aligned with equality.' 2 1 Fundamentally, diversity initiatives embody
an effort to overcome bias, address discrimination, and pursue equal-
ity, all core values of the legal profession and the rule of law. "The
United States occupies a special place among the nations of the world
because of its commitment to equality, broad political participation,
social mobility, and political representation of groups that lack politi-
cal clout and/or ancestral power," noted the American Bar Associa-
tion, explaining the "democracy rationale" of diversity, and pointed
out that "[w]ithout a diverse bench and bar, the rule of law is weak-
ened as the people see and come to distrust their exclusion from
mechanisms of justice." 122
Next, diversity is intimately related to access to lawyers and jus-
tice and to the quality of representation of the under-privileged. It is
not the case, of course, that only minorities or lawyers of lower socio-
economic background can or should represent other minorities or
lower class clients. Nonetheless, ample research suggests that empa-
thetic lawyers who actively listen to their clients, as opposed to imput-
ing to them generic goals, in part because they do not understand
their clients, their goals, their backgrounds, and their ways of reason-
ing, offer more effective representation.123 And while all lawyers, irre-
spective of their identities, could do their jobs effectively, a diverse
bar, class diversity included, is more likely to be able to meet and be
118. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735.
119. Lempert, supra note 11, at 714.
120. Id. at 713.
121. Wald, supra note I10 at 1101.
122. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS (Apr. 2010) at 9.
123. See generally William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991); Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and There-
fore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747 (2008).
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perceived as able to meet the goals of access to lawyers, justice, and
effective representation.124
Finally, as I argued elsewhere, "law not only means effective access
to lawyers, and through them to equity, justice, and first-class citizen-
ship, but also access to upward social mobility and key leadership posi-
tions because in the United States, political leaders are often drawn from
the ranks of the legal profession."1 25 Moreover, "[t]his understanding of
the role of diversity reframes and expands it from one that is focused on
the needs of minority communities, to an account that re-envisions op-
portunities for minority lawyers as leaders within the profession and so-
ciety."1 2 6 As importantly, it also questions simplistic measures of the
value of diversity which focus on whether minority lawyers (racial and
class minorities alike) directly serve minority communities.127 Because
socioeconomic status is not invisible, class diversity, especially within
the legal profession, may be of great value. Law schools and the legal
profession ought to pursue it, alongside other types of diversity, and act
proactively to make legal environments more welcoming and supportive
of visible class identity.
CONCLUSION
In Class in American Legal Education, Sander argues, passionately
and compellingly, that law schools should not simply employ the rhetoric
of diversity, but should pursue it vigorously, and should promote diver-
sity of all sorts, not only racial diversity.1 2 8 When it comes to racial di-
versity, Sander maintains that it is not enough for law schools to simply
admit students of color, if the result is that many fail to graduate or pass
the bar exam and do poorly as lawyers after graduation.129
It is at this junction that Sander begins to pursue a less persuasive
line of reasoning. Sander believes that given the costs and consequences
of racial-based affirmative action, it ought to be abandoned or at least
partially replaced with class-based affirmative action. As this Response
shows, however, Sander is wrong to argue that class-based affirmative
action is not going to be as costly as racial-based affirmative action. To
the contrary, because socioeconomic status is highly visible and plays
such an important role in both legal education and the practice of law,
class-based affirmative action is likely to be as, if not more, costly than
racial-based affirmative action.
124. Wald, supra note I10 at 1101-3.
125. Id. at 1103 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. For a recent thought-provoking challenge to simplistic ways of thinking about what it
means to be and appropriately act like a minority, see TOuRi, WHO'S AFRAID OF POST-
BLACKNESS?: WHAT IT MEANS TO BE BLACK Now (2011).
128. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 632, 664.
129. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1, at 481; see also Sander, Racial Paradox,
supra note 1, at 1773-76.
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More importantly, whereas Sander appears to believe that the solu-
tion to costly affirmative action policies is to abandon them or replace
them with less costly alternatives, the appropriate solution for law
schools is not to abandon affirmative action policies, but rather to meet
their challenges head on. Accordingly, to the extent that racial-based
affirmative action imposes significant costs on its recipients and non-
recipients, law schools ought not to abandon racial preferences, rather,
they need to enhance the educational experience of racial minorities. 1 30
Similarly, the fact that socioeconomic status is visible does not mean that
law schools should not pursue class diversity. Rather, it means that, in
addition to implementing socioeconomic preferences, law schools should
be prepared to support the educational experiences of students of lower
socioeconomic status and pursue measures that will help recipients of
socioeconomic preferences acquire and build social capital, including
networking skills and cultural capital, including the development of intel-
lectual self-esteem.
130. Likewise, and contrary to Lempert's position, to the extent that class-based affirmative
action imposes significant costs on its recipients and non-recipients, law schools ought not to aban-
don class preferences, rather, they need to enhance the educational experience of lower socioeco-
nomic minorities.
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